“As a legacy of the Spanish War we are left with … an immensely added interest in Central America and the Caribbean Sea.” – Theodore Roosevelt
Replete with incidents of international import in the past, the Caribbean attracts our attention because of the important part it has played in the development of the Western Hemisphere, the interest the United States has given it, and our future policy there.
In the Caribbean we may learn of the first instances of naval operations in the Western world when during the early sixteenth century the fierce Carib Indians came in their long war canoes to attack and pillage the new Spanish settlements in Puerto Rico. In the Caribbean “along [which] path a great commerce will travel, bringing the interests of the other great nations, the European nations, along our shores, as they have never been before,” we see the first instance of trade in the New World when Sir Thomas Pert and Sebastian Cabot after having been driven away from landing in Hispaniola “sayled toward the Illand of S. John, and entering into the port of S. Germaine . . . [said] that they came not to doe any harm but to trade and traffique for their money and merchandise.” Spain’s mighty empire of the Western Hemisphere had its inception and downfall along the shores of the Caribbean, which experienced the reverberations of European controversies by numerous changes in sovereignty of its islands. It was here “that there came to Drake the strength and craft that crushed the Spanish Armada” and here was the “nursery of the British Navy, the school where the thews were hardened and the sea lessons learned.” Along its northern shores and the Spanish Main there flourished for over two centuries the lucrative and exasperating regime of piracy.
American interest in the Caribbean was reflected in the early trade of the colonists with West Indian markets, and long before the Declaration of Independence the shores along the Caribbean re-echoed to the shouts of colonial volunteers from New England in Britain’s forces operating against the French and Spanish insular possessions. The Caribbean has felt the growing influence of American interest which has now developed to the point where its further advance in accordance with a determinate national policy demands the attention of those interested in the progress of the Western world.
Discovery and early developments.—On November 3, 1493, Columbus first sighted Dominica and a few weeks later landed at a more promising looking island and named it San Juan Bautista, later known as Puerto Rico. Although Columbus had solicited the aid of the English King, Henry VII was more interested in his own domestic troubles than in the arguments presented by Columbus’ brother with his maps, globes, and quotations from Plato. This indifference on the part of King Henry lost to him the renown of conquering a new world. Soon after the establishment of Spain’s claim to the newly discovered lands, the Pope, Alexander VI, “to whose hands the heathen were entrusted by God,” granted to Spain “the possession of all lands lying to the west of a meridian drawn 100 leagues westward of the Azores, and to Portugal all lands lying to the east of that line, the said line to extend to the Arctic and Antarctic poles, respectively.”4 Spurred on by the search for gold fields, new colonies were soon set up along the shores of the Caribbean. Aside from sporadic raids by Carib Indians, the new colonies enjoyed comparative peace until, interested in the fabulous reports of newly discovered wealth, Henry VII decided to investigate. Accordingly, the Cabots were commissioned to “sayle to all Partes of the East, of the West, and of the Northe,” in order to “seeke out, discover and finde, whatsoever Illes, Countreyes, Regions or Provinces, of the Heathennes and Infidelles, whatsoever they may be.” Mindful of the Pope’s proclamation, it is noteworthy that the King’s commission to his explorers refrained from mentioning any undertakings to the south where he knew the King of Spain already enjoyed possession. Although England did not enter into official trade relations with the new Spanish colonies, British merchants had long enjoyed trade there, since Gonsalvo de Oviedo reported in 1526 that “one Thomas Tison an Englishman had found the way to the West Indies, and was there resident ... it is probable that some of our mar- chants had a kinde of trade to the West Indies even in those ancient times. . . .”
Spain’s expected source of gold in the West Indies proved a bitter disappointment, and with lurid tales of newly discovered fields in Peru the colonists had no desire to remain in the Caribbean settlements. Emigration, along with the ravages of hurricanes, “disease, serampion, rheum, small-pox, and ill-usage,” soon turned Spain’s promising colony of Puerto Rico into a “vast jungle which everybody who could abandoned.” Emigration to the South American fields became exceedingly detrimental to West Indian colonial expansion; and Spain soon abandoned serious interest in her Caribbean possessions. It is true, she did not relax her trade restrictions with the islands but her greater penetrations in Mexico and South America caused neglect of the Caribbean, so much so that in 1536 the crown officers in Puerto Rico complained that no ship from the Peninsula had entered the ports of that island for two years.
Early interest of England.—During this time England began to develop a naval force strong enough to counteract the successes of the Spaniards. When Fletcher of Rye in 1539 hit upon the art of tacking, the “discovery forever memorable in the annals of seamanship,” England’s sea power was starting to ascend. Of contemporaneous importance in England’s future glory on the seas were the births in 1545 of Francis Drake and of the British national anthem when the parole aboard the Portsmouth fleet was, “God save the King!” and the answering sign was, “Long to reign over us!” England had already taken an occasional hand against the French during the war between Francis I of France and Charles V of Spain. The Channel was swarming with men-of-war, freebooters, and pirates, and when Henry became the common enemy of all Catholic Europe following his excommunication by the Pope, he had already begun to follow the practice of France which gave private merchants on the coast of Normandy permission to equip privateers to harass Spanish commerce.
The prospects of the capture of treasure more than that of new territory attracted Englishman and Frenchman alike. In her intense drive to bring home as much treasure as possible, Spain allowed her gold and silver bearing galleons to sail the seas without adequate protection. Her Caribbean defenses were so neglected that in 1553 Bishop Alonzo la Fuente reported to King Philip II from the West Indies that “traffic has ceased for fear of corsairs.” Soon the flourishing town of San German disappeared for want of protection against the French privateers. In the forts at San Juan there were no guns or ammunition. While English privateers continued their depredations against Spain’s commerce close to home waters, the French privateers operated with telling effect in the Caribbean until the Treaty of Vervins in 1598. Meanwhile Elizabeth had ascended the throne and after parting company with Spain she “began to wonder why a new world should be nothing but a New Spain.” Undoubtedly she concurred with the request of King Francis I of France when the latter, in questioning the right of the Kings of Spain and Portugal to divide the world among themselves, demanded of King Charles V, “Show me, I pray you, the will of our father Adam, so that I may see if he has really made you his only universal heirs!” Londoners had already seen a demonstration of Spanish wealth when “227 chests of bullion, 99 horseloads plus 2 carloads of gold and silver coin, and 97 boxes full of silver bars” were paraded through the streets upon the occasion of the marriage of Philip and Mary. Elizabeth desired some of Spain’s newly acquired riches without a formal declaration of war. With no love lost between Spain and England because of religious differences, the hatred entertained by the latter against her neighbor on the peninsula was increased greatly as a result of the Holy Inquisition. Spanish seaports become anathema for the English heretics. While no open declaration of war was made, the infliction of injuries upon Spanish trade by her freebooters was winked at by the Queen. Freebooting was deemed a lawful occupation for honorable and upright gentlemen of England and “to rob, fire, or scuttle a Spanish ship was a commendable work of grace.”
With funds advanced by two Lord Mayors of London and the Treasurer of the Royal Navy, Hawkins embarked on slave trading with New Spain even though he knew that he would be treated as a pirate by the Spanish. Although originally bound over under bond not to interfere with her “Majesty’s right good friend King Philip,” Hawkins set sail in 1567 on his expedition which was to be memorable in British maritime history.
From then on until over two centuries later when finally quashed by the United States Navy, piracy was intermittent in the Caribbean. With orders to his company “to serve God daily, love one another, preserve your victuals, beware of fire, and keep good company,” Hawkins began the sporadic warfare which struck fear into the hearts of the Spaniards. Hawkins and Drake contributed to the final break with Spain by their report of the Spaniards’ treachery at San Juan de Ulua and their incitement of the Queen to seize Spanish gold.
After the San Juan de Ulua affair Drake swore eternal vengeance against the Spaniards, and his subsequent warfare against the colonies and their trade brought forth many pleas for assistance from harassed colonial authorities. Finally the Spanish King,
provided two Gallies well appointed . . . and the first yeere they tooke sixe or seven Franch ships: After that no English or French warre that durst adventure to approach the coast, untill this present yeere 1586 that . . . Drake made spoile of Santo Domingo, Carthagena, and S. Augustine.
Every fortified city of Spain’s Caribbean colonies fell to British freebooters at one time or another. Drake’s raids along the Spanish Main as well as his memorable success along the Gold Road on the Isthmus helped establish him in the favor of the Queen. After she knighted him he led into the world of the West the first expedition sanctioned by the English crown. This unsuccessful venture, which cost the lives of his mentor, Hawkins, and himself, ended what might have given rise to a determined establishment of English supremacy in the Caribbean.
A new power appeared in the Caribbean when Holland, after obtaining her independence in 1609, began to raid Spanish trade. One of her expeditions successfully invaded Brazil; sacked Callao, Lima, and San Salvador; and almost succeeded in wresting San Juan from the Spaniards by the longest siege ever undertaken against that city. Meanwhile the French and English began to acquire possessions in the Caribbean. Spain’s resistance was practically nil in that sphere, as on the continent France had four armies in the field against her in 1637 while the Hollanders under intrepid Tromp had annihilated in the Channel a Spanish force of 70 ships and 10,000 of her best troops.
Freebooting and piracy.—With the decline of interest in her New World possessions due to decadence and corruption at home, Spain allowed the Caribbean to become the trysting ground for French, English, and Dutch filibusters. Without realizing that her colonies would serve her sea power abroad, Spain continued her former practice of shutting off her West Indian colonists from outside trade without herself providing for their wants. Attracted by the profitable contraband trade which was practically unrestricted and connived in by many crown officers, the French and English settlements were well filled with volunteers, while buccaneers and pirates set up their own transient bases of operations. The Welsh adventurer Sir Henry Morgan along with the Frenchmen l’Olonais, Pierre Legrand, and “Montbras the Exterminator,” soon instituted a reign of terror which occupied the colonial governors for the next century in attempts to dislodge the sea marauders.
Strategic positions, trade, and early American interest.—During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries France and England engaged in rivalry for the acquisition of colonial sites including unsuccessful attempts to edge Spain out of the Leeward Islands. It was at this time that American interest first manifested itself in the Caribbean when the newly established colonies along the Atlantic seaboard began the trade with the West Indies that was to be of paramount importance in the future development of the American colonies. While Spain was content to let her colonies shift for themselves with a lackadaisical regime of “Barraja, Botella, y Berijo,” Britain and France established themselves along the Windward Islands. The British had promising colonies in St. Kitts, Barbados, St. Croix, Nevis, and Barbuda. The Dutch took the A-B-C islands (Aruba, Bonaire, Curasao), and also Saba, St. Eustatius, and St. Martin.
Because of the prevailing trade winds the islands to the eastward were strategically important for naval operations. “Hold St. Lucia and the rest may perish!” expressed the British naval strategists’ idea of the importance of this focal point for launching sailing ship operations against the enemy. St. Lucia was the “Helen of the West Indies” and “caused more blood shedding than was ever provoked by Helen of Troy.”18 Seven times it fell to the English and seven times it was held by the French, the other islands of the Windward group changing sovereignty in like manner with the vagaries of the naval strategy and diplomacy of the European powers. Administrative blunders and vexatious delays in London accounted for England’s failure to obtain a larger lion’s share. The struggle for these strategic islands brought into prominence England’s growing sea power. Who can tell what the future consequences may be when the positions acquired for the purpose of launching campaigns of wind- driven surface vessels may serve for the air armadas of another day to sweep down on a foe to leeward in the Caribbean!
The struggle for trade coincided with that for insular possessions. Restricted by orders of council, the American colonists resorted to contraband trade with the Caribbean markets. Restrictions leveled against both the English and Spanish colonists tended to attract a large number of tradesmen intent on dealing illicitly with the islands and North American colonies. The Hollanders, contented with being intrenched along the more undesirable inner chain of the Windward Islands, seized upon the trade possibilities. Soon their ports became havens for foreign chandlers while their contraband warehouses were filled to overflowing. The trade with the small island of St. Eustatius at one time “rivalled the prosperity of Tyre and Sidon,” and yelling mobs of French, Dutch, Jewish, English, American, and Spanish merchants milled through the streets obstructed by boxes, cases, and bales left exposed for lack of storage facilities. Dutch men-of-war even convoyed the American privateers while some New England skippers sailed with Dutch papers. Commerce flourished until Rodney finally crushed it with his memorable capture of the place and ransom of 4,000,000 pounds sterling worth of merchandise and ISO merchantmen in the bay.
In addition to their Caribbean trade pursuits, many colonials from the Atlantic seaboard served in His Majesty’s forces in West Indian campaigns. New Englanders to the number of 3,700 enlisted for service during the “War of Jenkins’ Ear” and of these over two-thirds succumbed to fever and action under fire.
American independence.—After the American Revolution the new United States took a decided interest in the Caribbean. By our Treaty of Alliance with France we had agreed rather vaguely to guarantee France’s possession of her West Indian colonies and we were fortunate in not having been called upon to assist her in that area at a time when our country was being organized. Our success hastened Spain’s colonial disintegration in the New World and our influence was felt along the Spanish Main when we were the first to recognize the new republics. To the Caribbean colonies in their plea for independence we gave ample encouragement save to Cuba whose independence we opposed, entertaining as we did at that time the prospects of an early acquisition of the island. Subsequently when that failed to materialize by annexation or purchase, we preferred to have the island under Spain’s rule rather than to see it become British.
Shut off from West Indian trade by French and British orders at the close of our War of Independence, the colonists still enjoyed a profitable commerce with the Dutch islands and a few restricted ports in Cuba and Puerto Rico. By 1785, however, restrictions became lax and American merchants quickly prospered in Caribbean trade. In providing exchange for rum and sugar imports our firearms plants, iron works, and textile mills flourished, beginning our industrial development.
Eradication of piracy.—During all this time piracy continued rampant in the Caribbean despite the efforts of French, Dutch, English, and Spanish to stamp it out. The followers of Captains Kidd and Morgan developed such an efficient organization that the American authorities finally decided to rid the Caribbean of buccaneers. Where the European powers had been unsuccessful for 2 centuries, the United States cleared out the pirates within 10 years. Our Navy maintained a West Indian squadron for combating piracy from 1819 until the early thirties. Enduring the discomforts of open boat work, hurricanes, fever, and swamp warfare, our naval leaders of a later day had their initiation into the Navy while serving in the “Mosquito Fleet” against the pirates.
Spanish-American War.—The provisions of the treaty of Paris at the end of the war with Spain awakened the United States to her new position in the world with distant territory and colonial administration problems. Even though Mr. Dooley had proclaimed to his public at home that in the war we were in a dream but that the Spaniards were in a trance, that dream was merely a repetition of the one enjoyed in years gone by when some of our statesmen had visioned our expansion into the West Indies and ultimate control of the Caribbean.
As far back as 1857 an offer by the United States to buy Cuba for $100,000,000 brought the reply from the Spanish Prime Minister that “sooner than see the island transferred to another power, Spain would prefer to see it sunk in the ocean.” While we were thought to be imbued with the expansionist idea, our motive behind this offer was to improve conditions for our next door neighbor. Annexationists as well as expectant benefactors had carried out unsuccessful filibustering expeditions from our southern ports against Cuba. During the last half century of Spanish rule Cuba’s internal strife was a source of vexation to the United States and upon offering as high as $130,000,000 for Cuba, Secretary of State William L. Marcy expressed the sentiments of our country when he threatened to wrest the island from Spain by reason of human and divine justification.
We allowed the internal disorders of Cuba to go on until the final stage of the outbreak there in 1895 which led up to our involvement with the destinies of the island. Finally in 1898 came the war that was to launch us into expansion and control in the Caribbean.
Development of interest.—To Secretary of State John Hay is due the greater share of glory for whatever benefits the United States have received from Caribbean diplomacy. John Hay obtained from Great Britain her acquiescence to our paramount influence in the Caribbean by his negotiations which ended with the Hay-Pauncefote treaties; his advancement of the Platt Amendment for Cuban relations; and his almost successful purchase of the Danish West Indies. The European powers had been on the retreat from the New World for nearly a century, and Hay, with an isthmian canal in mind, desired the United States to continue the policy of edging them out. Britain’s chain of naval bases en route to the Panama area gave her a marked advantage in commercial control there. She also enjoyed according to the old Clayton-Bulwer treaty the same rights as the United States to the future construction of an isthmian canal. In view of England’s strategic position and the still undeveloped economic independence of the United States, the old treaty of 1850 was advantageous to the latter as she did not have sufficient capital for the canal’s construction. Later development showed subjected to such a long period of revolutionary misgovernment that it could neither protect its own rights against outsiders nor take care of the local interests of foreigners. From May, 1850, to July, 1902, there had been 53 revolutionary outbreaks in Colombia; on six of these occasions United States bluejackets and marines landed to protect our interests and insure the safe transit of the isthmus, while on three occasions the government of Colombia itself asked the Washington government to land forces to maintain the importance of abrogating the treaty as it limited our Monroe Doctrine. Commercial interests on both coasts as well as naval strategists pressed their desires for the canal’s construction. But first the treaty of 50 years ago, “the gash made … in the Monroe Doctrine,” had to be revised to our advantage. The British were reluctant to revise it, but John Hay with his characteristic tact and diplomacy, in close co-operation with Lord Pauncefote, assuaged the Anglo-American obstructions to our acquisition of the canal rights. His success was the keystone for the maintenance of our paramount influence and interest in the Caribbean.
Isthmian affair and Venezuelan incident. -- Subsequent to the Hay-Pauncefote treaties interest in the future canal grew rapidly. Although many contemporary historians cast aspersions on the conduct of the United States in the Colombian- Panama affair, it must be remembered that Colombia at the time was one of those Caribbean countries which had been subjected to such a long period of revolutionary misgovernment that it could neither protect its own rights against outsiders nor take care of the local interests of foreigners. From May, 1850, to July, 1902, there had been 53 revolutionary outbreaks in Colombia; on six of these occasions United States bluejackets and marines landed to protect our interests and insure the safe transit of the isthmus, while on three occasions the government of Colombia itself asked the Washington government to land forces to maintain order. For a long period we had exercised patience “to beyond the verge of proper forbearance” and during the revolution the Panama Junta in November, 1903, the Navy Department acted as the agent of the United States in carrying out the provisions of a long standing treaty between our country and Colombia by preventing any interference by Colombian troops. From the start “our course was straightforward and in absolute accord with the highest standards of international morality.” Ratification of the new treaty was delayed by the United States Senate due to the instigations of a press hostile to President Roosevelt’s policy and as a result of the protracted debates thereon he later gave vent to his determination to see ourselves pursuing a progressive development of interest in the Caribbean by saying, “I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate, and while the debate goes on the canal does also.”
Attention of the United States was directed to the Caribbean in 1902 when British and German ships blockaded Venezuelan ports to press payment of claims of their nationals. The consequences might have involved grave complications in view of the Monroe Doctrine had not Venezuela requested President Roosevelt’s assistance. Even after arbitration was referred to The Hague, the German blockade was continued and was not raised until our President convinced the German Ambassador of our intent to take action, as evidenced by the United States Fleet under Admiral Dewey having assembled in Puerto Rican waters for maneuvers. Thereby we demonstrated determination to maintain a predominant interest in the Caribbean area.
Development in Hispaniola.—Although accused of having “developed an excess dignity in an imperialistic world” after the war with Spain, our course of action regarding Hispaniola during the first quarter of this century was that of altruistic supervision to maintain order and peaceful development of our interest in the West Indies. The United States long watched burlesque unsubstantial governments in Santo Domingo and Haiti until common safety influenced her intervention. At one time when Admiral Dewey landed to pay a courtesy call on the Santo Domingan president, the naval party was fired upon by revolutionists. This incident passed without further complications, thanks to the Admiral’s speedy retirement and re-embarkation without further diplomatic courtesies. The forbearance of the United States with Santo Domingo reached its acme when one of the oft- proclaimed governments was in a small gunboat at sea while maintaining that it was in possession of the island and that the powers of making loans, peace, and war were vested only with the seagoing authorities. In spite of adverse charges, the United States has followed a policy of submission to petty misadjustments in Santo Domingo. Only when the peace and security of that republic as well as the Monroe Doctrine were threatened did we intervene.
When the United States took over the collection of all Santo Domingan customs in 1905 there came the end of the wild orgy of financial irresponsibility which had resulted in defaulting 7 loans totaling well over $30,000,000 during the preceding 30 years. In spite of the vehement protests of the press at his unconstitutional usurpation of authority, President Roosevelt in order to avoid difficulties with European powers entered into an agreement for our supervision over Santo Domingo’s financial affairs by a treaty which remained in effect 2 years before its ratification by the United States Senate. By the 45 per cent of revenues, which was given at that time to the government of Santo Domingo, that republic enjoyed a larger income than ever before. With a total debt of $32,000,000 and an annual income of only $1,850,000 our able officials by 1918 had wiped out all indebtedness; had a substantial surplus; and had vastly improved the economic, social, and educational conditions of the country. The intervention of the United States Marines in 1916 and their military government from 1918 until the middle of 1924 were instrumental in the betterment of the condition of people of the small republic.
As for Haiti, that country had in about the same course of time squandered over 150 million francs obtained by loans from France, and when in 1915 grave disorders followed the government’s failure of the previous year to meet payments on a $3,500,000 loan issue to France, Admiral Caperton assumed control of the island government. During the 4 years prior to our occupation the republic of Haiti had provided office for 6 presidents, none of whom remained in power for so long as a year. With the assistance of the United States supervision by the navy and marine forces, by September, 1924, the country had a surplus of $4,000,000, while there was a beneficial development of highways, malaria control, health clinics, water supply systems, and agricultural services.
Nicaraguan relations.—In Central America our policy has developed into a supervisory interest to allay the fears of foreign and home investors in view of sporadic revolutions. In addition we have had a vital interest in canal rights through Nicaragua and have demonstrated our determination to protect them. In 1906, 1910, and 1912 the United States Navy was called upon to lend its good offices in the interests of peace, while our financial supervision of Nicaragua’s customs from 1912 to 1925 not only freed the country of debt but established a substantial treasury balance. Our re-entry into the country in 1926 to eradicate lawlessness and banditry served as a guaranty of peace and order. Supervision of Nicaragua’s subsequent elections by the navy and marine personnel established a precedent of good feeling which has tended to make the country’s attitude cordially correspondent to our own in the Caribbean.
Policy in Cuba.—Upon the conclusion of the war of 1898 we opposed Spain’s desire to have Cuba annexed to the United States. Although we assumed the trusteeship of the island ad interim along with the responsibility of life and property there, the failure of our government to have the Cuban patriots participate in the final treaty of peace left us open to their charges of having “embittered the joy of Cuban victors with forcibly imposed tutelage”.
Upon the cessation of hostilities there was chaos in the island; the loans of 1886 and 1890, payable in gold, were still outstanding; $70,000,000 was due on the floating debt; and the island warfare had cost the bank of Spain $160,000,000. Even though we failed to give direct aid to the insurgents, compared with conditions of corruption which had existed under similar circumstances in other parts of the world, our primary supervision over the island’s interests was a fine trusteeship. By 1916 under our surveillance the treasury of Cuba had a surplus of $25,000,000. To some extent opportunist concessionaires turned the island into a hunting ground for their own gain, yet our management was most instrumental in establishing Cuban finances.
Aside from personnel in the naval station leased to the United States at the end of the Spanish-American War, our government has had forces in the island for 15 years of Cuba’s independence since 1902. Over 2,500 American marines were maintained there during the war in 1917-18 and until 1922 to protect United States sugar interests. Despite the display of arms, Washington has maintained a liberal and tolerant relationship with the insular administrators. We have followed a hands-off policy in conformity with our course of action in other Latin-American countries.
United States capital with the sanction of our State Department has maintained the financial integrity of Cuba in spite of the questionable administration there with which our government has declined to interfere. During the latter part of the war of 1917-18 Cuba obtained a $15,000,000 loan from the United States to rehabilitate sugar transportation systems. Subsequently with revenues of $108,000,000 and expenditures listed at $182,000,000 she defaulted on the foreign and internal debt. The only ensuing intervention on the part of the United States was to arrange the flotation of loans of $5,000,000 and then $50,000,000 for Cuba’s economic rehabilitation. This financial aid in spite of the political debacle which has been enacted in Cuba during the past few years was indicative of our faith in the pursuit of a determined and benevolent policy in Cuba.
The Virgin Islands.—Our first definite pronouncement of an interest in the Virgin Islands appeared in the Republican party’s platform of 1896 which stated that “by purchase of the Danish West Indies, we should secure a proper and much needed naval station in the West Indies.” In 1903 President Roosevelt advised Secretary of State Hay that the Dutch and Danish West Indies were becoming a source of temptation to Germany, and advocated building up our Navy and purchase of the Virgin Islands in connection with his Panama Canal program. The General Board of the United States Navy declared that the acquisition of the islands was most advisable as “every additional acquisition, the greater the value as against aggression from European bases,” and that the United States Navy would not be able, without a naval base in St. Thomas, to maintain itself in Puerto Rican waters.
With the encouragement of Admiral Dewey and the other members of the General Board negotiations were started to buy the islands. Although we failed then to strike a bargain because of haggling over the difference between our offered price of $4,250,000 and the Danish government’s price of $5,000,000, we obtained the islands 15 years later for $25,000,000 when we feared that Germany would try to acquire them for submarine operations against Panama Canal traffic.
We took formal possession of the islands in 1917 and maintained a beneficial naval administration there until February, 1931, when the government was turned over to the Department of the Interior. With the withdrawal of the Navy Department’s supervision by reason of the instigations of a small minority of dissatisfied local residents, the navy yard was abandoned and was recently transferred in a badly deteriorated state to the local insular government as a last vestige of our strategical policy of having acquired the Virgin Islands as a naval base.
Future of the Caribbean and Latin America.—The foregoing resume of the history of European and North American interest in the Caribbean has served to show the past importance of that area in our commerce and national policy. In view of the growing importance of the Panama Canal in international as well as domestic trade; our more beneficial and friendly relationship with South and Central America; and the importance of developing a more vigorous policy for the stability and safety of the Western world in unstable international affairs; the time has come for the United States to take a more decided interest in the Caribbean.
Although the United States has enjoyed a lucrative trade in the Caribbean since earliest colonial days, the development of our trade there during the past 35 years has opened large new markets previously closed to American manufacturers. Economic instability during world-wide depression has been mitigated in the Caribbean by United States capital. The recent negotiations of mutually beneficial trade agreements by Secretary of State Hull have shown that a more amicable relationship with our Latin-American neighbors has been of material benefit to economic recovery of the Western Hemisphere.
We should vigorously pursue our recent Latin-American relationships with the resultant betterment of this hemisphere’s security and stability. The resources of both continents should be developed with mutual benefit toward the guarantee of independence from European and Far Eastern influences. With the exchange of trade between the north and south markets, industries and local working conditions should improve to the advantage of all in the New World.
Events in Europe and Far East should awaken us to the importance of our relationship with South America and the benefits to be obtained by a better understanding there. Why not forestall that abrupt awakening by a new interest in the Caribbean and use the prestige gained there as a wedge for ultimate friendly penetration into the fields of South America previously barred to us by reason of Old World alliances through racial connections and trade exchanges? Why not act now and promote friendly trade missions supported by private as well as governmental subsidies? Trade associations such as the Rotarians will continue to pave the way for our industrial progress in connection with Latin-American trade, but a more concerted drive for mutual prosperity both north and south will be accomplished only by a more decided interest in the Caribbean and the lands to the south.
In view of the potential trade benefits available, we should promote commissions of leading trade representatives of the United States to spread their gospel throughout South and Central America. We should reduce travel fares under the American flag, reduce tariffs on South American products, give preferential quotas to their exports, and relax restrictions which have heretofore kept both continents from establishing their economic independence from outside markets, a condition which will be of future necessity to the security of the New World. It is difficult to presume that in view of the growing necessity to establish such security the United States will not be able to foster more beneficial trade agreements than can be extended by European and Far Eastern governments.
Government subsidies should aid sea and air transportation systems to our southern neighbors. Competition by foreign carriers will continue to increase until combated by faster and more adequate units. Preferential shipping rates and travel fares for Latin-American subjects should so develop transportation facilities that the republics of this hemisphere will be independent of foreign assistance during disorders which will tend to disrupt transportation. A more developed familiarity with Caribbean and South American ports by American commercial aviators and ships’ officers will prove of material advantage to our country in the event of activities demanding our attention in those areas, and this acquaintanceship can be developed only by an enlargement of our transportation agencies through government assistance.
In seeking more amicable economic and diplomatic relations, we must be prepared to contend with strongly entrenched opposition in the form of Old World cultural and racial ties. Foreign powers, not only European but Far Eastern as well, have subsidized and encouraged the emigration of their subjects to South American fields. In some instances such foreign settlements have been established to relieve the congestion of population at home, while it has been the evident intention in other cases to promote foreign colonies in an effort to counteract the interests of the United States.
A better understanding between the people of the northern and southern continents could be fostered by a well-organized exchange of cultural, educational, agricultural, and industrial facilities. This suggestion probably breathes of that abhorred bugaboo propaganda, but when careful thought is given to the importance of developing our interests to the south of us, then countenance will be given to the furtherance of such a policy of mutual aesthetic and economic relationships.
The most important agency for cultural exchanges is the radio. A carefully supervised program of broadcasts to the Latin- American countries will reap large rewards. Special high frequency broadcasts to our Spanish-speaking neighbors are highly appreciated in Central and South America. The solicitation of properly qualified artists and lectures for these programs would bring forth a large number of capable volunteers who would spread our gospel in exchange for similar programs from the south.
Governmental subsidy or the private support of exchange scholarships and professorships between North and South America offers another sure means of promoting good will. There should also be exchange of lecturers and touring artists of the concert and legitimate stage. European artists, students, and professors still find the South American field a lucrative one. Our educational institutions are of the highest grade while our technical and medical laboratories are unsurpassed in the world and yet the opportunity of advancing our ideas in exchange for those of our southern neighbors is lost through our indifference in allowing thousands of students each year to go from those countries to European institutions to assimilate ideas contrary to those in our Pan-American international policies. Cheaper travel fares along with reduced or government subsidized tuitions at selected schools can attract a large number of aspirants who will serve as our unofficial good-will messengers of the future.
Our technical and agricultural institutions should serve the governments of Latin America. The resultant development of local fields of enterprise would reflect in a better mutual understanding as well as the economic stability of the two Americas. Investigators, promoters, and producers would through their better understanding of each other’s problems serve to establish better relationships.
It is hardly probable that our own people would migrate to the undeveloped fields of South America. However, it is highly probable that if a better system of exchanging agricultural ideas existed some of our planters would be induced to investigate the possibilities of the southern fields and thus open a new agency for the development of our mutual interests.
The importance of our position in the Caribbean area and along the South and Latin-American coasts cannot be over-impressed upon anyone interested in the future safety of the United States. The former naval base at St. Thomas has been abandoned while in that same key area of the northeastern section of the Caribbean we have failed to develop any extensive naval facilities in Puerto Rican waters. Perhaps in the light of more startling developments in world affairs in the other comers of the globe we have become blind to the importance of the development of our interests to the south. The time wasted will seem precious indeed when the crucial moment finds us wanting in adequate naval facilities along the approaches to the Panama area. Perhaps the time will come for us to withdraw from European and Far Eastern spheres in the face of concerted action by foreign powers before we realize that the heritage left to us in the form of a fundamental and progressive development of interest in the Caribbean and in South America has been lost.
It is hardly probable that we shall ever again condone the action of our legislators in purchasing territory and its resident population as we did in the past. We do not expect to obtain the outright transfer of strategically important lands to us by reason of foreign debts of long standing but it might be logically possible to exchange in return for the cancellation of these debts the abandonment of whatever naval establishments along our shores our debtor nations might have. The acquisition of these bases for our own use without impairing the sovereignty of the possessions themselves or the absolute destruction of these naval facilities would be of material advantage to us in the furtherance of our policy of a decided interest in the Caribbean and adjacent areas.
For almost 4½ centuries the Caribbean has been an area of definite national interest. Paramount interest there should be the policy of the United States in view of its importance to the Panama and future Nicaragua canals as well as to the economic independency of the two Americas in the event of exclusion from foreign markets during international unrest. Blinded by interest in events taking place in other quarters, we should not fail to continue to develop the interest which has been handed down to us as a legacy of the past.