Maneuver Warfare Is Just Operational Art
Major Denzel argues that maneuver warfare theory is flawed and that Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1: Warfighting must be rewritten. The first point is inarguable: MCDP-1 has its flaws, although whether they are as profound as Major Denzel suggests is open to debate. As to the second point, there are valid arguments both for and against revising MCDP-1. In arguing for revision, however, he fails to make a strong case.
He argues that the “fundamental problem with MCDP-1’s conception of maneuver warfare is that a term for it already exists: operational art.” His statement betrays a misunderstanding of maneuver warfare, operational art, or both. Maneuver warfare describes a general tactical-operational approach to the conduct of war based on decentralization, tempo, surprise, and attack of critical vulnerabilities to trigger defeat through systemic disruption. Operational art describes the command process of arranging tactical means to achieve strategic ends.
There is an Army analog to maneuver warfare, but it is not operational art. It is “AirLand Battle” (ALB) doctrine, which was first codified in Field Manual 100-5: Operations in 1982. Like maneuver warfare, ALB emerged as a reaction to the dysfunctional U.S. approach to the Vietnam War. ALB focused on the operational problem of defeating a Soviet attack in central Europe. The Marine Corps, as the nation’s global force in readiness, had a broader remit. As a result, Warfighting started with a description of the nature of war and argued that maneuver warfare was the logical response to that problem. Addressing a narrower problem, ALB was able to provide specific guidance that met the typical definition of military doctrine. Addressing a broader problem, Warfighting was more philosophical and theoretical. This, in fact, has been a recurring criticism of Warfighting over the years: It is too abstract and not prescriptive enough, not enough like traditional doctrine.
Maneuver warfare and ALB are roughly compatible, although by no means identical. Both Operations and Warfighting were influenced by thinking on operational art, which developed roughly concurrently with ALB and maneuver warfare, but neither is strictly, or even mostly, about operational art. In fact, another criticism of Warfighting has been that it is too tactically oriented for a capstone doctrinal manual.
Major Denzel’s main criticism seems to be that maneuver warfare is unscientific: Its tenets are not falsifiable and its aims are unmeasurable. Implicit in his argument is that, ipso facto, this invalidates maneuver warfare. He is hardly the first to seek a purely scientific basis for the conduct of war. The Swiss military theorist Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, one of the foremost advocates of the scientific approach, has lent his name to a school of thought, of which Major Denzel clearly is an adherent. The Jominian school has long been dominant in modern Western military thought—with the notable exception of the U.S. Marine Corps since the Vietnam War.
As a response to the failures of the Vietnam War, maneuver warfare explicitly rejects the Jominian approach. The humanist Carl von Clausewitz replaced the scientist Jomini. Warfighting is explicitly Clausewitzian in its description of the nature of war and its emphasis on the mental and moral dimensions—on the unmeasurables.
Major Denzel is free to disagree with Warfighting’s anti-Jominian orientation; maneuver warfare is not holy writ and ought to be questioned. He deserves approbation for his willingness to speak up. As for his arguments in favor of revising MCDP-1 go, however, I have heard stronger.
—John F. Schmitt, former Marine infantry officer and author of Warfighting
The American Sea Power Project Phase III
Bravo Zulu to all the contributors to the “American Sea Power Project: Phase III.” Proceedings has outdone itself with an outstanding analysis of many of the aspects of the possible “War in 2026.”
If there is a shortcoming to this series, it lies in its political analysis. The war supposedly begins with a perfidious Chinese preemptive attack on U.S. forces throughout the Pacific. This will not happen. The Chinese must know that such an action would unify America. It is in China’s interest to preserve and foster a fractious dis-United States. To do this it will sacrifice tactical advantage for strategic gain. China also knows that many mutual defense agreements are triggered only when one of the signers is attacked, but not when a signer attacks another country. So, China will land forces on Taiwan and then wait for the Americans to attack the PLA on what China will claim is its sovereign territory.
The scenario also lists nations that might partner with the United States in a war with China. But many of these potential allies and partners have already adopted a “one China policy” that accepts that Taiwan is an integral part of China. Some governments attempt to dance on the head of a pin about this topic. Their citizens are likely to show little enthusiasm for a war over something that, in their minds, was resolved ages ago. If the United States intends to fight China over Taiwan, it needs to be able to do so on its own. If it cannot, it needs to avoid the fight altogether.
The gist of “The War of 2026” is that the U.S. Navy is woefully unprepared to fight a peer-to-peer war and that it will take a lot of money to correct this. The argument would have been far more persuasive if the series had concluded with a call for a dedicated increase in tax rates to pay for rearmament. Should this ever happen, then we will know the situation is truly “existential.”
—Guy Wroble
My approach to the War of 2026 scenario would be fundamentally different from the five articles presented in the December 2023 issue.
Jomini said that what is important in war is to use decisive force at the decisive location. I just completed a four-day drive around 740 of the 770 miles of Taiwan’s coastline, and I would definitely concur with Ian Easton (author of The Chinese Invasion Threat, 2017) that the critical area is the coastline south of the Tamsui River. If the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gains a beachhead there, it would have a port (Taipei), an airport (Taoyuan), and a coastline. In my opinion, he is correct in that the few remaining beaches of Taiwan are insufficient for an invasion.
Regarding the size of the invasion force, none of the six articles gave any kind of an estimate. The World War II Normandy invasion used 7,000 ships to land 120,000 troops. It is possible a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would use as many as 25,000 ships to land 1 million troops. Then the problem becomes, “How do you sink the portion of these 25,000 ships landing near Taoyuan?” This could be 10,000, ranging from small fishing boats to 50,000-ton ships that would be beached.
Clearly, even under the best of circumstances, attack and guided-missile submarines could sink only a fraction of those ships. Aircraft would have to do most of the work. Mines and a variety of bombs are available for tactical aircraft and bombers, and the Air Force has the ability to turn C-17s into “arsenal aircraft” carrying numerous Long-Range Antiship Missiles each, potentially accounting for hundreds of ships per sortie.
Former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert was on the right path in suggesting “payloads over platforms.” Repelling an invasion will require thousands of weapons, but nowhere in the Phase III articles was the desirability of Navy arsenal ships even mentioned.
—William Thayer
Fighting Submarine Maintenance Bottlenecks
It is apparent how similar submarine maintenance bottlenecks are to aircraft maintenance ones. The similarities extend to what is at stake if these bottlenecks are not overcome. They also extend to innovative solutions and the adaptive leadership required to inspire, recognize, and apply those solutions. Simply put, there is a connection between solving the Navy’s submarine maintenance bottlenecks and our experiences with solving aircraft maintenance bottlenecks. To understand the overarching problem, the joint force should focus on generating the required capability to succeed when limited U.S. industrial capacity can no longer guarantee overwhelming advantage.
The authors frame well the challenges the Navy faces balancing maintenance requirements with fielding its submarines operationally. Air wings face similar challenges regarding sustainability across aircraft inventory. As maintainers, we have experienced unit flying-hour programs as they enter the so-called maintenance death spiral. Maintenance bottlenecks create less aircraft availability, leading to higher utilization of fewer aircraft, driving increased maintenance, and resulting in more bottlenecks.
After studying one such problem, we applied Eliyahum Goldratt’s “theory of constraints” methodology as a ground-level approach with significant effect. The unit not only recovered from the loss of a substantial number of first-quarter flying hours, but also went on to fly more than 100 percent of the planned final programmed hours. This mission-critical accomplishment came about thanks to efficiencies realized by focusing on how limited resources were applied to several maintenance bottlenecks. It is a small example of innovations necessary to overcome the macro-capacity and sustainability challenges facing the joint force.
Dr. Giachetti and Dr. Beery highlighted significant challenges that result from the dynamics associated with a complex environment. The traditional linear systems used today—holdovers from the industrial era—will no longer suffice in the “volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous” environment we experience. As the authors note, systems thinking may improve the process, but radical innovation through collaboration may provide solutions to the bottlenecks where they happen most, at the deckplate/ground level.
We applaud the authors’ recommendations for improvements within the bureaucracy, but might it be better to hear solutions from those who operate daily in it? Leaders can establish an environment that encourages change through innovation. A culture of innovation is accelerated through diversity, creativity, and, most important, trust, as a study on open innovation in Sustainability (December 2020) argues. This may be the possible solution to adapt and afford the flexibility lacking in a bureaucracy, providing agility in the face of today’s volatility and uncertainty.
—Col Andrew Wineberger, Lt Col Jesse Fritz, and Col Neil Theisen, NYANG
Logistics 2030: Foraging Is Not Going to Cut It
Colonel Donlon is correct to focus on logistics as the weak link in the idea of operating ground forces in a contested region. However, he appears to be operating under the assumption that the United States is going to have enough control of the air and sea that it can operate large ground-effect seaplanes and traditional forms of logistical support. I don’t think that is a good assumption.
A better model of logistical support is what the Japanese did to support their troops on Guadalcanal. Lacking daytime control of the air and sea, in summer and fall 1942 the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) resorted to submarines, barges, and surface ships to supply its troops. Initially, the IJN fought to regain control of the air and sea, and it attempted to reinforce its troops by using the conventional approach of vulnerable merchant vessels.
After this failed, the Japanese used submarines, barges, and destroyers to supply the garrison. The destroyers would make runs under the cover of darkness and would tie 55-gallon drums together and then push them over the side so that the garrison could attempt to retrieve them. Convoys of barges from Bougainville would travel at night and hide among the islands to avoid U.S. warships. Finally, in 1943, the IJN was able to use these methods in reverse to withdraw the garrison without being detected.
The U.S. Navy should plan in part on using small landing craft or barges to carry cargo short distances as the Japanese did. The advantage of barges is their expendability. However, the most effective means of supplying ground troops would be submarines. Submarines would be largely invulnerable to missiles and aircraft while in transit. An unloading process could be developed to allow the submarine to stay submerged and release the supplies in buoyant containers, similar to the 55-gallon-drums concept, to float the supplies to the surface. So that they can be built in quantity, the logistics submarines should be small enough and use air-independent propulsion to be substantially cheaper than nuclear-powered ones.
—LCDR Tim Stipp, USNR (Ret.)
Bring the Naval War College Into the Future
Now-Captain Wright’s arguments deserve consideration; his evidence is compelling; and, for any of us concerned with the U.S. Navy’s human collateral, the article is well worth reading. But I am not convinced he has fully explored all sides of his case.
Having experienced university graduate-level education as both a student and a teacher, I believe curriculum and course content constitute only part of the value proposition. As students recognize those among their cohort who consistently bring a strong fastball to the game, they reflect on their own contributions. Over time, students benchmark their capabilities against those of their peers. Durable, trusting professional relationships grow out of the intense environment of reading, lecture, and discussion in the graduate seminar room.
The long-term effect of professional graduate education results from more than just peer professional relationships. By recommending former students at subsequent inflection points in their careers, graduate faculty in any educational setting function as coaches and mentors. When a graduate school (or even undergraduate) faculty member is asked to assess a former student with whom they had little direct contact, the quality and value of that recommendation are diminished.
We should provide the best possible environment for the professional development of the next generation of Navy leadership. Over time, remote learning may fall short of the needs of the service and American national security.
—Alan Bliss
A Safety Assessment from the Deckplates
Congratulations to Seaman Arredondo on earning second prize! His is a great idea and was well presented. It caught my attention because of my Navy engine-room-related hearing loss.
When I worked for Boeing, I had a collateral assignment similar to his safety sailor idea. Some of us had some National Safety Council training for our safety assistant jobs, and we wore green hard hats when we were doing that job. Something similar may be useful to the Navy.
I hope Big Navy will pick up on his idea and implement it fleetwide. It is hard to be a good warfighter if you are injured unnecessarily doing something unsafe.
—CWO4 Louis W. Bruneau, USNR (Ret.)
Asked & Answered
James Forrestal’s absence from the discussion about Secretaries of the Navy (SecNavs) who led Navy and Marine Corps progress is notable, but he has been absent from many such conversations.
Although Forrestal may be more well known as the first U.S. Secretary of Defense (SecDef), his guidance of the Navy as SecNav from 1944 to 1947 in partnership with Chief of Naval Operations Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King was nothing but forward looking and transformative. His postwar record in particular sets him apart from all other SecNavs. On his appointment, he started to think about the shape of postwar national defense and the role of American sea power in it. He saw earlier than others that the Soviet Union was the future competitor to the United States and its other allies. He also questioned whether the U.S. Navy understood the Royal Navy sufficiently to replace it as the world’s policeman. But often preying on his thoughts were the long-term implications of misguided and politically driven inquiries into the attack on Pearl Harbor and how they would affect the national defense and its organization.
The result was the creation of the Department of Defense and the post of the SecDef. In that role, he sought to temper the competing demands of the Army and newly created Air Force. He also warned of overconfidence in new technology and hastily performed analyses of tactical World War II engagements—the latter a concern he learned from the British Admiralty.
The pressure to seek compromise among the military services contributed to Forrestal’s 1949 suicide, as he sought solutions that could best fit all services and preserve their ability to defend the United States and its interests. Significantly, Forrestal saw the allies of U.S. sea power as Congress and the American people. He was ever cautious of exceptional navalism and cautioned vigilance about the defense bureaucracy, which sometimes has objectives other than the future of sea power. His drive to focus on the future of the U.S. Navy helped produce top naval leaders such as Admiral Arleigh Burke, who became Chief of Naval Operations in 1955. Forrestal’s efforts ensured the office of the Secretary of the Navy was not abolished. In the tense postwar years of defense unification, Forrestal saw that the U.S. Navy had a future, one for which every subsequent SecNav—and the nation itself—owes him an enormous debt of gratitude.
—James W. E. Smith, Laughton-Corbett Research Fellow, Department of War Studies, King’s College London
You Can’t Win Without (More) Submarines
Many thanks for your excellent December 2023 issue, which is packed with interesting and thought-provoking articles. One small point in the interest of accuracy, though, is that the two helicopters pictured on page 41 passing a People’s Liberation Army Navy Type 072A landing ship do not appear to be the troop transports indicated in the caption. Instead, I believe they are a pair of the more formidable Changhe Z-10 attack helicopters, a distinction that could be of some import to a Proceedings reader who encounters them outside the pages of your magazine!
—Ben Parker